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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE REINSTATEMENT RIGHTS OF ECONOMIC STRIKERS:
LAIDLAW FIVE YEARS AFTER
In this comment the author discusses the effect of the Laidlaw
doctrine upon an economic striker's right to reinstatement. The
author traces the historical development of the doctrine and
addresses the four principal issues surrounding it: the duration
of the right to reinstatement; the limitation of the right by
agreement; the doctrine of substantially equivalent employment; and the so-called "business justification" rule.

Laborers may strike for many lawful reasons; labor lawyers recognize
but two-the advancement of "economic" ends' and the protest of an
employer's unfair labor practice.2 The distinction matters in large part
because the rights of strikers differ according as the categories of their
strikes differ. 3 Most significantly, the unfair-labor-practice striker enjoys an unconditional right to reinstatement upon the termination of
1. The goal of an economic strike may be anything which concerns wages, hours, or working
conditions, and which is prohibited neither by law nor by collective bargaining agreement.
See, e.g., NLRB v. Transport Co. of Texas, 438 F.2d 258, 262 n.6 (5th Cir. 1971); NLRB
v. Herman Wilson Lumber Co., 355 F.2d 426, 430 (8th Cir. 1966); Note, Reinstatement:
Expanded Rights for Economic Strikers, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 511, 512-13 (1970). The National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter the "'Board") and the federal courts use the term
"economic strike" to mean any lawful strike which is not an unfair labor practice strike.
2. An unfair labor practice is a violation of § 8 of the National Labor Relations Act (hereinafter the "Act"), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970), and an unfair labor practice strike is one caused
or prolonged by an employer's unfair labor practice. For an extended examination of such
strikes see generally Note, The Unfair Labor Practice Strike: A Critique and a Proposal
for Change, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 988 (1971).
3. The categories are far from static. What begins as an economic strike, for instance, may
not always end up as one for, if during the course of the strike the employer commits an
unfair labor practice (such as firing the strikers or refusing to bargain), the strike is from
that moment on transformed into an unfair labor practice strike and all of' the rights and
responsibilities attendant to such a strike immediately attach. The commission of an unfair labor practice is, of course, a matter for the Board to decide, and until the Board does
decide neither the strikers nor their employer can be entirely certain where they stand.
Thus, too, if workers strike over their employer's presumed unfair labor practice and the
Board subsequently exonerates the employer, the strike is generally considered an economic one from the beginning. The loser of this sort of industrial wager may find himself
in rather close circumstances, and unions are understandably quite attentive to an employer's conduct during a strike. See generally Stewart, Conversion of Strikes: Economic
to Unfair Labor Practice: II, 49 VA. L. REv. 1297 (1963); Stewart, Conversion of Strikes:
Economic to Unfair Labor Practice, 45 VA. L. REV. 1322 (1959).
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his part in the strike,4 while his brother, striking for economic reasons,
enjoys at best a qualified right.' The nature of the unconditional right,
in the former instance, has never caused much controversy. 6 The
qualified right of the latter-with which this note is concerned-has
caused a great deal.

THE OUTLINES OF THE LAW: LAIDLAW IN BRIEF
Since mid-1968, the economic striker's rights to reinstatement have
been governed by the National Labor Relations Board's decision in The
Laidlaw Corp.7 Reduced to essentials, Laidlaw makes two demands of
an employer following a strike: (a) if a lawful economic striker's
former, or equivalent, position is still available upon his unconditional
offer to return to work, the striker must be reinstated without prejudice in that position; and, more to our interests, (b) if the striker's
former, or equivalent, position is for legitimate business reasons not
then available to him, the striker (if himself still available) must be
sought out whenever such a position does open up and must be given
preference in filling it-unless the employer can show some other
"legitimate and substantial business justification" for refusing to do so.
The first of these two requirements was far from new with Laidlaw,
having been acknowledged over some 30 years of prior statutory labor
practice.' The second, which was new, and which overruled a significant body of precedent established by that practice, constitutes the
"Laidlaw doctrine" today.
The traditional reason why an economic striker's former position
might not be available upon his return lies in the employer's presumed
right to attempt to carry on his business by hiring permanent replacements for his striking employees. 9 Part of the familiar wisdom of labor
law has long been the assumption that the guarantee of permanent
employment is a necessary inducement in obtaining striker replace4. So long as his former job or one substantially equivalent to it still exists, the striker is entitled to full reinstatement, and any replacements hired during the strike must be discharged, if need be, to make room for him. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270,
278 (1956); NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 130 F.2d 919. 927-28 (2d Cir. 1942).
5. The chief qualification lies in the fact that an economic striker who has been "permanently" replaced must wait until the replacement leaves (or another similar job opens up)
before he can be reinstated. See notes 9 & 10 infra and accompanying text.
6. Thus, no one has yet sought to maintain that an unfair-labor-practice striker should be
penalized for his employer's misconduct. But see Note, supra note 2, wherein the author
does argue for an amendment to the Act which would encourage greater reliance upon
Board procedures and less resort to the strike in settling unfair labor practices.
7. 171 N.L.R.B. 1366 (1968), enforced, 414 F. 2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920
(1970).
8. See Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 114 F.2d 820 (3rd Cir. 1940).
9. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, :345-46 (1938). These replacements must, of course, have obtained whatever rights they claim to their positions prior
to the strikers' own unconditional requests for reinstatement. See H. & F. Binch Co. v.
NLRB, 456 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1972).
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ments in the first place;' 0 and it was the tension between, on the one
hand, the employer's right to permanently replace his striking workers
and, on the other, the workers' right to abandon their strike and return
to their jobs which precipitated the many years of unrest leading up to
Laidlaw.' ' Curiously enough, the seeds for both sides of the conflict
lay, as is now generally recognized, in a single case: NLRB v. Mackay
Radio and Telegraph Co.' 2

THE SOURCES OF THE LAW: FROM MACKAY RADIO
TO FLEETWOOD TRAILER
The notion that economic strikers may be denied reinstatement after
having been permanently replaced finds its earliest and highest judicial
support in Mackay Radio. The employer in Mackay had hired replacements for its striking employees and in so doing had assured 11 of the
replacements that, if they wished, their jobs might be permanent. When
the strike ended, five of the 11 chose to stay on. Thereafter, in
determining which five of the returning strikers were to be denied
reinstatement, the employer happened upon those five "who were
prominent in the activities of the union and in connection with the
strike."' " En route to its holding that the strikers were statutorily
protected employees, and that such discrimination was prohibited by
the National Labor Relations Act, the Supreme Court paused to observe that the permanent replacement of economic strikers was not in
itself unlawful, and that an employer "is not bound to discharge those
hired to fill the places of strikers, upon the election of the latter to
resume their employment, in order to create places for them."' ' What
the employer in this case was bound to do, the Court held, was simply
to refrain from denying to certain of the strikers, "for the sole reason
such opportunities for
that they had been active in the union,'''
reinstatement as it might offer others. The declaration of the employer's right to permanently replace strikers, while admittedly fundamental
to the Court's holding, was nevertheless not at issue and has been
criticized as dictum.6 Yet the dictum quickly became doctrine, and
Mackay became the universal citation for the proposition that
10. This assumption, along with the conclusions built upon it, has not gone unchallenged. See
generally Schatzki, Some Observations and Suggestions Concerning a Misnomer-Protected" Concerted Activities, 47 TEX. L. REV. 378, 382-92 (1969); Comment, The Mackay
Doctrine and the Myth of Business Necessity, 50 TEX. L. REV. 782 (1972).
11. An abbreviated discussion of this period follows in the text. For more detailed treatments,
see generally Hirsch, Laidlaw-The Mackay Legacy, 4 GA. L. REv. 808 (1970); Martin.
Rights of Economic Strikers to Reinstatement: A Search for Certainty, 1970 Wis. L. REV.
1062 (1970).
12. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
13. Id. at 339.
14. Id. at 345-46.
15. Id. at 346.
16. See, e.g., Note, Replacement of Workers During Strikes, 75 YALE L. J. 630 (1966).
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economic strikers need not be reinstated once their jobs have been
filled by permanent replacements.' 7
Subsequent readings of Mackay concerned themselves less with examining the doctrine than with entrenching it. While the Court had
expressly recognized that former strikers who had neither been reinstated nor "obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent
employment" remained "employees" under § 2(3) of the Act, 8 it had
offered no opinion on whether this employee status would endure
permanent replacement.'
To many, that seemed enough to say that it
did not. Thus, Representative Hartley's 1947 bill to amend the Act
specifically excluded from the § 2(3) definition of "employee" any
striker who had been "replaced by a regular [i.e., permanent] replacement"2 °-the exclusion being presented as legislative adoption of
Mackay. 2' The House approved the exclusion, but the Senate deleted it
and prevailed in conference. 2 2 Recognition that strikers could be
denied reinstatement, however, was written into the Act (albeit without
comment on their status as employees) as new § 9(c)(3), where with
some modification it remains today.2 3

17. Adams Bros., 17 N.L.R.B. 974 (1939), appears to represent the Board's first use of "the
Mackay rule." More recently, the Supreme Court again recited the rule with approval ("It
is settled that ...")in NLRB v. International Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48, 50 (1972).
18. NLRA § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970), provides: "The term 'employee' shall include...
any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any
other regular and substantially equivalent employment ....
" The definition reads the
same today as it did in Mackay's time (1938).
19. One might speculate, however, that the Court's choice of language consciously reflected a
continuing, rather than a severed, employer-employee relationship. Commenting on the
legitimate means available tr selecting strikers to be reinstated, the Court said: -[The
employer] might have resorted to any one of a number of methods of determining which of
its striking employees would have to wait because five men had taken permanent positions
during the strike .... 304 U.S. at 347 (emphasis added).
20. I Legislative History of the National Labor Relations Act, 1947, 34 (GPO ed., 1948).
21. "The Board now says that an employer may replace an 'economic' striker, one who strikes
for higher pay or other changes in working conditions. The bill writes this rule into the act,
saying that a striker remains an 'employee' 'unless such individual has been replaced by a
regular replacement'...." Id. at 303, H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
22. The legislative history of the Act contains no clear statement of the reasons for rejecting
Rep. Hartley's interpretation of Mackay. It would appear, however, that the effect of
writing that interpretation into the Act was not misunderstood: "Here again"the employer
is given the power to terminate the status of a striker by replacing him." Id. at 359, H.R.
MIN. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), discussing the proposed amendment to
§ 2(3).
23. Section 9(c)(3) provides:
No election shall be directed in any bargaining unit or any subdivision within which,
in the preceding twelve-month period, a valid election shall have been held. Employees [on] engaged in an economic strike who are not entitled to reinstatement
shall [not] be eligible to votel.]. . . in any election conducted within twelve months
after the commencement of the strike ....
29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1970). Bracketed material was deleted, and italicized material
added, by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (the "LandrumGriffin Act"), Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 702, 73 Stat. 519.
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But if Congress had left the question at least arguably open, the
courts, with the Board close behind, soon moved in to close it. Shortly
after the Taft-Hartley amendments became law, the 7th Circuit, in Sax
v. NLRB,2 4 found in Mackay support for its holding that economic
strikers ceased to be employees at the moment they applied for reinstatement and were, because permanently replaced, denied it. The
Board itself had found no need to inquire whether Sax's replaced
strikers remained employees (although its trial examiner had concluded
they did not 2 5), and had instead thrown most of its weight into
holding that the strikers' application for reinstatement was a continuing
one 2 6 and should not have been dismissed by the employer merely
because no jobs were available on the day the strikers applied. The
court disagreed. To honor the Board's decision, it said, would be "to
relieve the strikers of their duty to apply when a job is available, and to
shift the burden to the employer of seeking out one of the strikers to
fill the job or be guilty of discrimination." 2 The court made clear its
opinion that neither the Act nor the circumstances of the case warranted any such result. Ignoring the history and even the bare language
of § 2(3) altogether, and reading Mackay to equate the permanent
replacement of a striker with the termination of his employment, Sax
in fact prefigured the holdings of both the courts and the Board during
the 1950's and early 1960's.
Following Sax, the striker's position continued, inexorably, to erode.
In Bartlett-Collins Co. 2 1 the Board agreed that permanently replaced
economic strikers "merely have the right not to be penalized for their
concerted activity, and are not entitled to preferential status in hiring."'
Replaced strikers, it was clear, shared the same rights-no more
and no less-as any 3 other applicants for new employment. In
Atlas Storage Division o the Board found that the elimination "for
24. 171 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1948), denying enforcement of Container Mfg. Co., 75 N.L.R.B.
1082 (1948).
25. The examiner's reasoning apparently proceeded thusly: in the language of § 2(3), an individual whose work has ceased remains an employee only if the cessation stems from "a
current labor dispute." The current labor dispute in this instance, having taken the form
of a strike, ended when the strike ended-yet the strikers who had been replaced were
still out of work. Left high and dry, as it were, their "continued unemployment then was
attributable, not to the existence of a current labor dispute, but rather to the fact that they
had been legitimately replaced," and so "their status as employees actually ended ... "
75 N.L.R.B. 1082, 1106 (1948). This reading of the Act was evidently intended to counter
Mackay's recognition that strikers remained employees until they obtained "other regular
and substantially equivalent employment." See also Textile Workers Union of America v.
Arista Mills Co., 193 F.2d 529, 534 (4th Cir. 1951). The Mackay interpretation, of course,
carried the greater judicial authority.
26. 75 N.L.R.B. at 1106, citing Matter of Republic Steel Corp., 62 N.L.R.B. 1008, 1028-29
(1945).
27. 171 F.2d at 771.
28. 110 N.L.R.B. 395 (1954), enforced sub nom., American Flint Glass Workers Union v.
NLRB, 230 F.2d 212 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 988 (1956).
29. 110 N.L.R.B. at 397.
30. 112 N.L.R.B. 1175 (1955), enforced sub nom., Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local 200
v. NLRB, 233 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1956).
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economic reasons'' 3 of a striker's former job left him in the same
position as if he had been permanently replaced-which was to say, in
no position at all. And by the time Brown and Root, Inc.3 2 was
decided in 1961 it had become entirely settled that the determination
whether a striker was to be reinstated or not was to be made only on
the day he applied for reinstatement, and that if the employer had no
need for him on that day (either because he had been permanently
replaced or his job had been legitimately abolished) then all duty owed
him as an employee ceased.3
The pace of reversal began the following year when, in Philanz
Oldsmobile, Inc.," the Board chose to distinguish between the permanent and temporary absorption of a striker's former job. Finding that
the employer's business had "declined substantially following the
strike,"'3 s and that therefore permanent replacements could not have
been hired for all of the strikers, the Board posited an obligation to
reinstate the unreplaced strikers as soon as production built up and
work once more became available-unless it appeared that the employer
could advance other nondiscriminatory business reasons for refusing to
do so.
Philanz never went to court for enforcement but another case quite
similar to it did-and resulted in the first Supreme Court pronouncement on economic reinstatement rights since Mackay. The case was
Fleetwood Trailer Co. 3 6 and it grew out of a two-week economic strike
during which the employer both cut back production to one-half the
prestrike level and hired a number of replacements. Upon the strikers'
request for reinstatement, the employer refused, maintaining that "the
plant was not in need of employees and that no strikers could be given
immediate employment." ' ' Subsequently, however, as production began climbing back to normal, the employer hired six new employees, all
nonstrikers, for work which six of the jobless strikers were qualified
and waiting to perform. Eventually the six strikers were themselves put
back to work (as new employees), but upon their charge of discrimination a complaint issued.
The trial examiner, finding that the employer had at all times
intended to increase production to its full prestrike level as soon as
practicable, determined that the shortage of jobs following the strike
was no more than temporary, and, rejecting Brown and Root3" in favor
31. In this case the striker's job was absorbed, because of a decline in business, by other employees. The absorption was apparently assumed to be permanent. 112 N.L.R.B. at 1180.
32. 132 N.L.R.B. 486 (1961), enforced as modified, 311 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1963).
33. 132 N.L.R.B. at 494. This soon became known as the so-called "day-of application" rule.
34. 137 N.L.R.B. 867 (1962).
35. Id. at 871.
36. 153 N.L.R.B. 425 (1965), enforcement denied, 366 F.2d 126 (9th Cir. 1966), vacated and
remanded, 389 U.S. 375 (1967).
37. 153 N.L.R.B. at 426.
38. -[Brown and Root] arises in a different factual setting. I find that holding concerning the
right of reinstatement of economic strikers to jobs not open at the time of application not
controlling here." Id. at 427 n.4 (Royster, Tr. Exam.).
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of Philanz, concluded that the strikers should have been reinstated
before the new employees were hired. The Board adopted the trial
examiner's report without comment; but the 9th Circuit, in a sharply
worded 2-1 decision, 3 ' declared that the distinction between permanent and temporary job shortages was of no moment, that Brown and
Root still controlled, and that, in effect, the employer in this case was
entitled to hire anyone he chose.
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded. 4" In a wide-ranging
opinion, Mr. Justice Fortas affirmed the strikers' continuing status as
employees under § 2(3) of the Act, dismissed as a technicality the old
day-of-application rule imposed by Brown and Root, and introduced
the relatively new doctrine of business justification to striker reinstatement cases. 4
Depending largely upon how one felt about strikes and strikers to
begin with, the decision in Fleetwood was either long overdue or largely
overdone. Those taking the first position could point out that, after all,
Mackay itself had long ago recognized that strikers remained statutory
employees until they obtained "other regular and substantially equivalent employment," and, all of the intervening cases notwithstanding, no
one had ever really explained how the Act could be read otherwise.4 2
If this much were granted, as it seemingly had to be, then the "technicality" upon which Brown and Root was founded had only its age to
support it; its pedigree, reaching back to Sax, amounted to nothing
more than a history of misapplication of the Act and of Mackay.
Moreover, if the act of refusal to reinstate an economic striker was
prima facie evidence of discrimination, as Mr. Justice Fortas had announced it now was, then the recently solidified rule of business
39. The court said:
The trial examiner referred to this case [Brown and Root) and held that it was not
controlling, without discussing why it was not controlling.... We cannot agree
with the trial examiner. We find it difficult to approve the Board's cavalier use of
precedent when it desires to follow it, and the disregard of it when it wishes to
achieve a different result. On the basis of the Board's own policy as stated in Brown
and Root, supra, we hold that whether or not a vacancy exists must be determined
at the time the strikers apply for work after the strike.
366 F.2d at 129.
40. 389 U.S. 375 (1967).
41. Justice Fortas said:
It was clearly error to hold that the right of strikers to reinstatement expired on
August 20, when they first applied. This basic right to jobs cannot depend upon
job availability as of the moment when the applications are filed. The right to reinstatement does not depend upon technicalities relating to application. On the
contrary, the status of the striker as an employee continues until he has obtained
"other regular and substantially equivalent employment." (29 U.S.C. § 152(3).)
Frequently a strike affects the level of production and the number of jobs. It is
entirely normal for striking employees to apply for reinstatement immediately
after the end of the strike and before full production is resumed. If and when a job
for which the striker is qualified becomes available, he is entitled to an offer of reinstatement. The right can be defeated only if the employer can show "legitimate and
substantial business justifications."
Id. at 380-81.
42. But cf. note 25 supra.
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justification, which required an employer to come forward and explain
his apparent discrimination to the satisfaction of the Board, must come
automatically into play.
This reading of Fleetwood, which we might call the expansive one,
seemed certainly consistent with the opinion. The restrictive reading,
on the other hand, sought to distinguish the opinion from the case and
to rely exclusively on the latter. Those who adhered to it 4 would
maintain that much, if not most, of Justice Fortas' decision was
excessive of the issue before the Court-that issue, as Mr. Justice
Harlan appeared to recognize in his concurrence, 4 4 being limited to
whether the Board's own decision could be supported by substantial
record evidence. Were the Fleetwood Company strikers "employees,"
to whom their employer owed a duty of reinstatement, or were they
not? They were, under all prevailing standards (including those of
Brown and Root), if they had not yet been permanently replaced and if
their jobs had not yet been permanently abolished when they asked to
return to work. Since no one contended that the strikers had been
replaced, the only remaining question concerned the status of their
jobs. The Board itself had never proposed-and has never proposed to
this day-that strikers' rights to reinstatement must outlive the genor that Brown and Root's day-ofuine abolishment of their jobs, 4
application rule would have been improper had the jobs in fact been
abolished. Its position, rather, was that these strikers' jobs still existed
and had only been rendered temporarily unavailable because of conditions following the strike-a determination of fact which the Board
was unquestionably empowered to draw and which, if warranted by the
evidence, should have been routinely upheld.4 6 The effect of reversing
the 9th Circuit then, under this view, was merely one of affirming the
Board's determination that Brown and Root had nothing to do with the
facts of the case, and that the employer had, as Justice Harlan put it,
"simply failed, for whatever reason, to recognize", 4 1 that the strikers
remained statutorily protected employees.
The Board, as it turned out, took the expansive view and with it in
short order fashioned the final tomb not only of Brown and Root but
of Bartlett-Collins, Atlas Storage, and "all other cases of similar import",4 ' as well. The instrument of its choice was Laidlaw.
THE LAIDLAW CORPORATION AND ITS PROGENY
Laidlaw started -out as yet another permanent replacement case, not
particularly different from the many such cases preceding it. As in the
43. See, e.g., Scallon, PreferentialHiring Rights of Economic Strikers, 19 LAB. L. J. 195, 197
(1968); Comment, Preferential Hiring Rights of Economic Strikers, 73 DICK L. REV. 322,
328 (1969).
44. 389 U.S. at 381.
45. Brief for NLRB at 10, 18-19, NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967).
46. Cf. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
47. 389 U.S. at 383.
48. The Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366, 1370 (1968).
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previous cases, the employer had replaced economic strikers and then
refused them reinstatement. Subsequently, as certain of the replacements departed, the employer hired new workers.4" In finding that an
unfair labor practice had been committed, the Board, citing Fleetwood,
not only rested upon the proposition that a striker's protected status as
an employee extended beyond the date on which he was lawfully
refused reinstatement, but also announced that an employer bore the
positive duty to seek out such a striker in the event his old job, or a
similar one for which he was qualified, later opened up. It was this duty
which the employer in Laidlaw had breached by hiring new applicants
rather than former strikers.5 0 Again borrowing a page from Fleetwood,
the Board made it clear that the only saving device available to an
employer caught up in this situation was a showing that the failure to
reinstate strikers proceeded from a legitimate and substantial business
justification. Absent such showing, a prima facie "inherently destructive"'' violation of the Act would be found. The 7th Circuit agreed
with the Board's result5 2 and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.' 3
Duration of Reinstatement Rights
Today, Laidlaw is clearly the rule in the majority of Circuits, " and
even in those which have not yet spoken no counsel would advise that
it be ignored. Once past this point, however, most counsel may grow
rather more cautious in their advice-for Laidlaw itself offers little
instruction in the affirmative duties it imposes. One issue, for instance,
quite frequently alluded to by the cases and the commentary, concerns
49. The trial examiner had found that the main body of strikers (about 40) applied for reinstatement on February 11. All but five had been replaced by that date, and these five
were duly reinstated. Over the next 10 days some 16 additional strikers, who had not
applied on February 11, made written application for reinstatement. As the Board described it:
On the dates these later applications were received Respondent checked to see
if vacancies existed at that time, and, if they did, some of the applicants were
hired. However, new applicants were hired if the vacancies exceeded the number
of striker applicants .... The Respondent did not check over the earlier reinstatement applications of February 11 before making new hires, and reinstatement applications were considered only on the date of application.
Id. at 1369.
50. The Board summed up its point of view as follows:
A refusal to consider or reinstate strikers once they have been replaced when vacancies thereafter occur is in effect a "delayed" discrimination which does not assume
a mantle of lawfulness merely because certain lawful conduct, the hiring of a permanent replacement, intervened.
Id. at 1369 n.16.
51. Id. at 1369.
52. 414 F.2d 99 (1969).
53. 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
54. See, e.g., Retail Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (dictum); H. & F.
Binch v. NLRB, 456 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1972); Little Rock Airmotive, Inc. v. NLRB, 455
F.2d 163 (8th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Hartmann Luggage Co., 453 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1971);
NLRB v. Johnson Sheet Metal, 442 F.2d 1056 (10th Cir. 1971); American Machinery
Corp. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1970). The remaining circuits have not considered the question.
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that of how long a permanently replaced striker will retain his right of
preferential rehire. Inferentially, the right is perpetual so long as the
striker does not himself put an end to things by such means as refusing
a proper offer of reinstatement or by obtaining other "regular and
substantially equivalent" employment. This is, in fact, the Board's
express view '-although not everyone else feels comfortable with it.
Former Board Chairman Farmer, as one who does not, has suggested
that any time period in excess of 12 months would appear inconsistent
with § 9(c)(3) of the Act,' 6 but this limitation has since been rejected
by the Board and, at least, the 6th Circuit.' '
If the employer's obligation under Laidlaw to maintain and follow
his preferential hiring list in fact carries no time limitation of its own,
can the employer in any way himself construct such a limitation and
thereby terminate his obligation short of fulfillment? Until recently,
the answer appeared to be that he could. Judge Wisdom, writing for the
5th Circuit in NLRB v. American Machinery Corp.,"5 was "not impressed" with the employer's contention that its conduct was justified
by "the difficulty of seeking out strikers 'several months' or 'five years'
after the application for reinstatement ....
9 He did, however, offer
this suggestion:
",

[An employer] might notify the strikers when they request
reinstatement of a reasonable time during which their applications will be considered current and at the expiration of which
they must take affirmative action to maintain that current
status. A reasonable rule would not contravene Fleetwood's
assertion that "[t] he right to reinstatement does not depend
upon technicalities relating to application." 6 0
Evidently, then, a striker who failed to take "affirmative action"
prior to the employer's announced deadline would find that his rights
to reinstatement had lapsed. In commenting on the suggestion the
Board said:
[A] lthough we find it unnecessary to consider at this time ...
[Judge Wisdom's proposal] .... we see no reason why the
Respondent cannot at reasonable intervals request the employees on the preferential hiring lists to notify it whether they
desire to maintain their recall status. 6
55. Brooks Research & Mfg., Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. No. 93, at 7-8 (March 27, 1973). This case,
touching upon a number of issues, contains the Board's most detailed discussion of the
Laidlaw doctrine to date.
56. Farmer, Issues and Practical Problems Caused by Fleetwood Trailer and Laidlaw Manufacturing, 4 GA. L. REV. 802 (1970). Section 9 (c) (3) is set tbrth in note 23, supra.
57. NLRB v. Hartmann Luggage, 453 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1971).
58. 424 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1970).
59. Id. at 1327-28.
60. Id. at 1328.
61. Brooks Research & Mfg., Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. No. 93, at 9 (March 27, 1973).
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The reason which the Board had not seen appeared shortly. Faced
with a typical Laidlaw-type situation, the employer in Food Service
had acknowledged the union's unconditional request for reinCo.6
statement with a letter which, first, claimed that no work was available
and, next, attempted to set forth what the employer apparently considered a reasonable application of Judge Wisdom's American Machinery proposal. After advising that all strikers should report to the
employer's office and either execute new application forms or examine
their old ones "to assure that the information contained therein is
the employer went on to state that the applications would
accurate,''
remain current for 30 days, during which period, if vacancies occurred,
those employees eligible for reinstatement would be notified. Once the
30 days expired, however, the employees who had not yet been
reinstated would have 10 more days "during which to either notify the
Company in writing or to personally come to the office of the Company and indicate" 6 4 their desire to renew their applications. If the
strikers did so, their applications would "then be renewed for an
additional thirty (30) day period and the procedure discussed above
[would] then be repeated." 6
The Board, speaking through its Administrative Law Judge, concluded that an unfair labor practice had been committed.
I find that the imposition of the notification and registration
requirements is of sufficient concern to the former strikers...
as to constitute a mandatory subject for collective bargaining
with their representative, whether or not the requirements were
reasonable. I therefore find that the Respondent's 6unilateral
action also violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 6
Thus, Laidlaw's collateral effect on an employer's duty to bargain
concerning the return of economic strikers who had been permanently
replaced or whose jobs had been absorbed had apparently gone unexamined, the old rule quite naturally having held that no such duty
existed. 6 7 Whether the new rule is to become as conversely rigid as the
old remains to be seen. The decision in Food Service does not clearly
state whether the bargaining requirement runs only to the employer's
demand for periodic notice from the strikers or whether it also includes
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

202 N.L.R.B. No. 107 (March 30, 1973).
Id. at 22 (decision of Administrative Law Judge).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 38 (citation omitted).
According to the trial examiner in Coca Cola Bottling Co., 166 N.L.R.B 134 (1967):
(The return of permanently replaced strikers] of course is not a mandatory subject
of bargaining, inasmuch as an employer is under no obligation whatever to provide employment for an economic striker who has been permanently replaced.
Therefore no unfair labor practice can be predicated on an employer's refusal to
bargain about his return.
Id. at 140.
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the initial "request" that new applications be filed and old ones be
brought up to date. 6 8 Indeed, the Administrative Judge's language
could be argued in either direction. Reason and some slight precedent, 6 9 however, would suggest that an employer ought to be able to
freely obtain at least the information it needs in making good-faith
reinstatements: current addresses and telephone numbers, certainly,
and perhaps other job-related information as well. The proper test of
bargainability, then, would seem to rest upon whether requirements
imposed by the employer act only to reasonably assist in carrying out
the duty to reinstate or whether they may be calculated to abridge in
some manner the strikers' already vested rights. In Food Service, for
instance, the employees would most likely have lost nothing by ensuring that their files were accurate and up to date, while they stood to
lose quite a bit (through inconvenience at best, forfeiture of status at
worst) if they assumed the burden of keeping their names alive on the
employer's list.
There is little to indicate how much bargaining activity really takes
place when it comes to applying Laidlaw, although certainly nothing
suggests the practice is at all widespread. It may be interesting to see, in
this respect, whether the effect of classifying such negotiations as
mandatory will impel more employers to insist upon clarifying or
delimiting their duties through agreement. Those who decide to try
should consider the Board's treatment of such agreements in two cases:
United Aircraft Corp.7 0 and its companion Laher Spring & Electric Car
Corp.7 1
The employer in United Aircraft had entered into a strike settlement
agreement which provided, inter alia, for both the immediate reinstatement of those strikers whose former or similar positions were still
available and for the creation of a preferential hiring list from which the
remaining strikers would be reinstated as work increased. The parties
had agreed, the Board found, that this hiring list would remain in effect
only until the end of the year (about four and one-half months), and
that the preferred status of any unrecalled strikers left on the list at
that time would expire. After the end of the year, the employer
abandoned the list and began hiring the remaining strikers as new
employees. The General Counsel argued (and the trial examiner found)
that the employer had thereby violated the strikers' rights as set out in
68. Of course, if the employer's intention was to unilaterally deny reinstatement to any
striker who might fail to complete a new application, or to review his old one, then the
requirement would be obviously invalid.
69. Bargain Town of Ponce, Inc., 200 N.L.R.B. No. 149 (1972), at least recognizes the use
of "Laidlaw forms" (current address and information sheets filled out by the strikers at
the time they request reinstatement) as a means of assisting the employer in contacting
the strikers. An employer may not, however, go so far as to require the union to furnish a list of strikers desiring reinstatement and to rest upon the union's failure to do so
as relieving the employer of its obligations to the strikers. The Rogers Mfg. Co., 197
N.L.R.B. 180 (1972).
70. 192 N.L.R.B. 382 (1971).
71. 192 N.L.R.B. 464 (1971).
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Laidlaw, but the Board, with two members dissenting, 7 2 held otherwise. Noting past decisions in which the Board had either upheld union
waivers of certain statutory rights (including the § 13 right to
strike 7 3), or had deferred the adjudication of unfair labor practice
charges in favor of the parties' own arbitration agreements, the majority
concluded that the public policy of encouraging the resolution of
disputes through collective bargaining would uphold this agreement as
well. Moreover, the Board felt there might be practical reasons why
such an agreement would be desirable:
If, as the Supreme Court has held, an employer can unilaterally terminate the reinstatement rights of strikers for legitimate
it would seem that
and substantial business justifications,"
such rights should also be terminable by agreement between the
employer and the bargaining representatives of the strikers.
They are in the most favored position to know the business
needs of the employer and the prospects of substantially equivalent employment elsewhere. A union may also by agreement
obtain other benefits for employees in return for a concession
as to a reinstatement cutoff date.'7
The Board took care, however, to point out that its approval was
purely discretionary, that it was not to be bound as a matter of law by
72. Members Fanning and Brown, dissenting, construed the recall agreement as providing
that "all strikers who had registered for reinstatement would be recalled until the Respondent reached its prestrike complement, which occurred on April 30" of the following year. The members noted that, even if they were able to find that the unrecalled
strikers' rights had terminated under the agreement at the end of the year, "we would
be compelled to hold that such a result was repugnant to the purposes and policies of the
Act." In addition, the members saw such an agreement as creating:
a serious conflict with Section 9(c) (3) of the Act which provides for the eligibility
of economic strikers to vote in a representation election for a period of 12 months
after the commencement of a strike. Because of [this] factor alone, it seems doubtful that the Board should honor any strike settlement with a terminal date of less
than 1 year.
The dissenters did not address the question whether a union was qualified to waive
strikers' rights in the manner of this agreement, saying only that "[elven if there may exist
a limited area in which the parties could waive strikers' recall rights, this is not an appropriate case in which to approve such a waiver." 192 N.L.R.B. 382 (1971) (citation
omitted).
73. Section 13 of the Act provides:
Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed
so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or
to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right.
29 U.S.C. § 163 (1970). This right is frequently waived (usually in conjunction with the
employer's waiver of the right to lock out) in collective bargaining agreements.
74. This assertion may be overly absolute. An employer may refuse to take back strikers who
for one reason or another are unqualified for reinstatement (who have, in other words, no
actionable reinstatement rights to begin with) and may thereby terminate their status as
employees, but about the only way in which he can terminate the rights of strikers who
are qualified for reinstatement is by permanently eliminating their jobs (for bona fide
reasons) or by going out of business altogether (for any reason). See generally pp. 10708, infra.
75. 192 N.L.R.B. 382, 388 (1971).
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any private adjustment of rights guaranteed by the Act, and that any
agreement of this sort would be expected to meet certain standards
before authority would be granted it. For those agreements which did
meet the Board's standards, the outlook appeared encouraging:
So long, therefore, as the period fixed by agreement for the
reinstatement of economic strikers is not unreasonably short, is
not intended to be discriminatory, or misused by either party
with the object of accomplishing a discriminatory objective, was
not insisted upon by the employer in order to undermine the
status of the bargaining representative, and was the result of
good-faith collective bargaining, the Board ought to accept the
agreement of the parties as effectuating the policies of the
Act ... 7 6
The Board found that the United Aircraft agreement met these
standards, and that the employer had entered into and had performed
its obligations under the agreement in good faith. But, as the Board also
noted, the agreement itself had been executed some eight years prior to
the decision in Laidlaw-at a time when the thinking reflected in
Brown and Root held undisputed control. Thus, by extending preferred
hiring status to the strikers for even four and one-half months (in itself
"a not unreasonably short period"), the Board found that "Respondent
gave [the strikers] reinstatement rights which exceeded the requirements of the law as it was then understood." That much was certainly
clear, and, partly because it was, the Board declined to apply Laidlaw
retroactively. What was not so clear, however, was the effect such an
agreement might have been given if entered into after the decision in
Laidlaw-for it would then of course act not as an extension of the
strikers' basic rights but as a knowing restriction of them. On this point,
the Board made no direct comment.
Laher Spring, for its part, did concern a settlement and recall
agreement executed after Laidlaw. But while the Board rejected the
agreement it also managed to sidestep the issue left open in United
Aircraft. Without considering the intrinsic validity of the recall agreement itself,7 ' the Board found that it constituted merely an element in
76. Id.
77. The trial examiner, however, found the agreement void. Characterizing the right to reinstatement as a public (rather than merely an individual) right, created (rather than merely
protected) by statute, the examiner rejected the employer's contention that the right could,
like the right to strike or to establish terms of seniority, be waived by the bargaining representative. He commented:
It is difficult to see how the Union, or the bargaining representative here, could
waive or bargain away the right to reinstatement given by the statute to the individual striker because the bargaining representative, as such, has no right, title or
interest in that right to reinstatement created by Section 2(3) of the Act. In fact Section 2(3) is one of the protections which the individual enjoys against both his employer and his union. Without Section 2(3) of the Act, the individual striker would
be completely at the mercy of unscrupulous employers and unions in situations
such as the present. With Section 2(3) the striker is entitled to reinstatement regardless of his employer or his bargaining representative.
192 N.L.R.B. 464, 475 (1971).
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the employer's scheme to avoid reinstating the strikers. Specifically, the
Board found that the employer, taking advantage of the six-month
limitation set forth in the agreement, had deliberately refrained from
rebuilding its work force and had substantially increased the amount of
overtime assigned during that period. This plus the "dramatic increase"
in new hires following the six-month expiration date led the Board to
conclude that the employer had entered into the agreement only in
order to lend a contractual "cloak" to its intended evasion of duty.
Citing its decision in United Aircraft, the Board again stressed the
understanding, "[iimplicit in any strike settlement agreement," that
"all parties will make a good-faith effort to comply with its terms."
Here, however, instead of good faith, the Board found only "discriminatory manipulation"-and so set the agreement aside.
Thus, while it is clear that good faith will constitute the dominant
element of any recall agreement which the Board chooses to accept,
neither of these two cases will stretch so far as to support a flat
assertion that strikers' rights under Laidlaw are freely alienable. The
most one can say is that, in the words of United Aircraft, "the Board
ought to accept" a sufficiently fair-minded agreement as dispositive of
these rights. Yet the contrary view, as exemplified in the trial examiner's discussion from Laher Spring, is not entirely without force of its
own. Neither, of course, is "good faith" the most certain of standards.
In this rather unemphatic context, the deliberate phrasing "ought to
accept" may seem to the conservative-minded to take on the appearance of a flashing yellow light at a particularly tricky intersection.
Substantially Equivalent Employment
If the employer is, in most instances, precluded from singlehandly
abridging a striker's reinstatement rights, obviously the striker himself is
not. Should he, for example, at any time prior to reinstatement obtain
other regular and substantially equivalent employment he will by force
of statute terminate his former employer-employee relationship-and
along with it his right to reinstatement. Any answer to the question
whether a given striker has in fact obtained such employment must,
however, be distilled from the circumstances of his own case. And, as
these circumstances are bound to be unique, so is the answer. Thus, in
Little Rock Airmotive, Inc., 7 8 the Board, disclaiming the existence of
any "mechanistic" test for settling the issue, observed:
The question of what constitutes "regular and substantially
equivalent employment" . . . must be determined on an ad hoc
basis by an objective appraisal of a number of factors, both
tangible and intangible, and includes the desire and intent of the
employee concerned. Without attempting to set hard and fast
guidelines, we simply note that such factors as fringe benefits
78. 182 N.L.R.B. 666 (1970), enforced as modified, 455 F.2d 163 (8th Cir. 1972).
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(retirement, health, seniority for purposes of vacation, retention
and promotion), location and distance between the location of
the job and an employee's home, differences in working conditions, et cetera, may prompt an employee to seek to return to
his old job.7
So saying, the Board turned its attention to a sheet metal worker
who had returned from a recent operation to light-duty work only two
days prior to joining the strike. Having then been permanently replaced,
the striker had taken another job elsewhere, also as a sheet metal
worker, at 5¢ an hour more than his old rate. He was, however, still
physically unable to carry a normal workload and so quit the new job
after a week. Later, with the departure of one of the replacements, the
striker's old job again opened up-but no offer of reinstatement was
ever made to him. Should one have been? The trial examiner thought
not: in his opinion the striker had clearly obtained other equivalent
employment (even if only for a week) and had thereby severed whatever ties remained with his former employer. The Board disagreed,
reasoning that, because the striker was able to perform the temporarily
limited duties of his former job as they existed prior to the strike, he
could not have obtained regular and substantially equivalent employment by taking on work which he could not perform."0 The 8th
Circuit, in its turn, reversed the Board, stating that both the striker's
"new job and his regular job were as a sheet metal worker," and that if
he "could not perform those duties for his new employer he was
incapable of performing them for the [former employer] as well." ' '
The court went on to intimate that the point was not one of equivalent
employment at all but rather of the striker's basic unfitness for reinstatement under any conditions. "If anything," the court said, the
striker's physical disability "stands as a8 legitimate and substantial business reason for refusing reinstatement." 2
Whatever the true message of Little Rock Airmotive, the fact of
three mutually inconsistent views on a single issue probably advises
against spending too much time in any given case arguing over substantially equivalent employment. The outcome is likely to be too unpredictable to rely upon-although, from the infinitude of possible factors which the Board appears ready to consider, one might conclude
that the chances of establishing any actual equivalency of employment
are rather small. Of course, nothing precludes a striker from taking
temporary employment while awaiting reinstatement (indeed, he may
have no choice but to do so), and, irrespective of the characteristics of
his new job, if the striker himself considers it only temporary, and is
79. 182 N.L.R.B. at 666.
80. The Board also attached considerable significance to its finding that the striker had,
during this period of outside employment, repeatedly informed his former employer of his
desire for reinstatement. Id. at 668.
81. 455 F.2d at 169.
82. Id.
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willing to say so at the hearing, the job will most likely be found only
temporary and not equivalent. From a practical standpoint, then, all
this amounts to a fairly strong, if unspoken, presumption against any
striker obtaining substantially equivalent employment prior to being reinstated. Perhaps because this is so, the issue is not frequently raised:
Little Rock Airmotive, in fact, appears to represent the most notable of
the few cases in which it has played any significant part.
Business Justification
As initially developed, the business justification rule had nothing to
do with the reinstatement of strikers. It was conceived, instead, as a
means of positioning the burden of proof in those § 8(a)(3) cases' '
which normally hinged upon the employer's motive.8 4 Thus, in the
classic § 8(a)(3) proceeding, a violation would be made out only if the
employer could be shown to have intended to discriminate against and
thus discourage union membership. Such intent, if not inferable from
the "inherently destructive" or otherwise completely unjustifiable nature of the conduct itself, would normally require some measure of
independent evidence: i.e., some opening demonstration by the Board's
General Counsel that the conduct was undertaken from hostile or
antiunion motivation. In the latter instance, where intent was at issue,
the employer would typically seek to counter the General Counsel's
contentions by showing that his conduct was warranted by legitimate
business (i.e., nondiscriminatory) considerations-that he would, in
effect, have done the same thing even if there were no union. The rule
changed things somewhat by making the employer responsible for
putting on his evidence of justification first, and while failure to rebut
the prima facie case against him would normally result in a conclusive
finding of violation, the converse (that a convincing display of business
justification would absolve the employer) was not necessarily true-for
his justification could still be overbalanced, in the Board's view, by the
General Counsel's own demonstration of unlawful intent. 8 ' Thus,
under the rule, the employer could be assured of escaping § 8(a)(3)
83. Section 8 of the Act provides:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization....
29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970).
84. For discussions of the role of motive in establishing violations of § 8(a) (3), see generally
Christensen & Svanoe, Motive and Intent in the Commission of Unfair Labor Practices:
The Supreme Court and the Fictive Formality, 77 YALE L.J. 1269 (1968); Janofsky, New
Concepts in Interference and Discrimination under the NLRA: The Legacy of American
Ship Building and Great Dane Trailers, 70 COL. L. REV. 81 (1970); Oberer, The Scienter
Factor in Sections 8(a) (1) and (3) of the Labor Act: Of Balancing, Hostile Motive, Dogs,
and Tails, 52 CORNELL L. Q. 491 (1967).
85. Thus, as the Court had noted earlier, in NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 at 228
(1963), "[clonduct which on its face appears to serve legitimate business ends... is
wholly impeached by the showing of an intent to encroach upon protected rights."
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liability only if his burden were sustained and the General Counsel's
8
were not. 6
Both Fleetwood and Laidlaw claimed to place great weight upon the
rule, and upon the respective employers' failure to advance any satisfactory evidence under it; but neither the Board nor the courts in either
instance offered any insight into what sort of evidence the employers
might have shown-or, indeed, into the ultimate question of whether
they might have been able to show anything at all. The only support for
assuming that they could have shown anything, and that the rule could
work in reinstatement cases, came from two wholly nonrelated examples of "business justification" identified by Mr.. Justice Fortas in
Fleetwood:
In some situations, "legitimate and substantial business justifications" for refusing to reinstate striking employees who engaged in an economic strike have been recognized. One is when
the jobs claimed by the strikers are occupied by workers hired
as permanent replacements during the strike in order to continue operations. [Citing Maclkay, NLRB v. Plastilite Corp.,'7
and Brown and Root.] ......
A second basis for justification is suggested by the Boardwhen the striker's job has been eliminated for substantial and
bona fide reasons other than considerations relating to labor
relations: for example "the need to adapt to changes in business
conditions or to improve efficiency.""s
86. As the formula was expounded by Mr. Chief Justice Warren in NLRB v. Great Dane
Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967):
First, if it can reasonably be concluded that the employer's discriminatory conduct was -inherently destructive" of important employee rights, no proof' of an
antiunion motivation is needed and the Board can find an unfair labor practice
even if the employer introduces evidence that the conduct was motivated by
business considerations. Second, if the adverse effect of the discriminatory conduct
on employee rights is "comparatively slight," an antiunion motivation must be
proved to sustain the charge if the employer has come forward with evidence of
legitimate and substantial business justifications for the conduct.
Id. at 34. And so the rule:
Thus, in either situation, once it has been proved that the employer engaged in
discriminatory conduct which could have adversely affected employee rights to
some extent, the burden is upon the employer to establish that he was motivated
by legitimate objectives since proof of motivation is most accessible to him.
Id. (Emphasis in original.)
87. 375 F.2d 343 (8th Cir. 1967).
88. The citation to Brown and Root is something of a puzzle here, unless the Court perhaps
intended to show that its invalidation of the day-of-application rule was not to be construed
as affecting permanent replacement cases.
89. 389 U.S. at 379, quoting from Brief for NLRB at 15. The Board clearly found no difficulty
in accepting the possibility that jobs might be abolished:
An employer might, for example, anticipate a reduction in business for an indefinite period because of general economic or other business conditions. That retrenchment plan might be put into effect during a strike, with the consequent
abolition of some jobs .... Similarly, during the period of'
a strike but tbr substantial business reasons independent of it, an employer might decide that a particular production line was inefficient and should be automated or eliminated. Apart
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Both these themes had been heard before. The first, of course, was
simply another restatement of Mackay-which the Court had never
shown any inclination to discard anyway. 9 0 The second dated back to
(and beyond) the surviving portions of Atlas Storage.9 ' Neither had
anything to do with the case at hand, and if the object of the Court had
been merely the reaffirmation of established teachings it could easily
have accomplished that much without wrapping them in new doctrine.
As it was, Laidlaw soon enough unwrapped the practice of permanent
replacement by announcing that it would only defer, and no longer
defeat, reinstatement. But by that time Fleetwood's purpose to establish the doctrine had apparently been served-so much so, in fact, that
even after eliminating the only one of its two "justifications" which the
employer might conceivably have shown, the Board in Laidlaw could
still insist that he show something else. That there was nothing else to
show, however, seems borne out by the five years of cases which have
followed: for in no other instance where the Board has found that jobs
were open and qualified strikers were still available to fill them has any
employor succeeded in justifying his refusal to let the strikers return to
work. 9 2 Indeed, the theory seems to be that once the Board can
reasonably conclude that a true reinstatement situation obtains-i.e.,
that (a) a former striker, seised of Laidlaw-type rights, is available and
(b) that the striker's former or equivalent job, for which he is still
qualified, is also available-then justification for not reinstating the
striker simply no longer exists. The employer who reaches this point,
from duty-to-bargain considerations and assuming no antiunion motivation, there
would be no unfair labor practice in refusing to reinstate strikers whose jobs had
thus been abolished.
Brief for NLRB at 16-17, NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967).
90. In point of fact, however, an employer's exercise of his Mackay prerogative seems hardly
a "'justification" in the strict Great Dane sense, for, so long as the Board and the courts
remain unwilling to inquire into the reasons for replacement, neither the exercise itself
nor the resultant refusal to reinstate is impeachable by a showing of antiunion motivation.
Motivation, indeed, is apparently irrelevant where Mackay is at work. See American Ship
Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 311 (1965).
91. Saying that one shows "business justification" for his conduct by proving that he acted
"for substantial and bona fide reasons other than considerations relating to labor relations" sounds rather like saying that one upholds the law by not acting illegally. At
least insofar as motive is an issue under § 8(a) (3). anything an employer does to a striker
or his job, if done solely for good reasons not connected with labor relations, should
qualify as fair play. To the same effect is the often quoted bromide that an employer may
fire an employee for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all-just so long as he
does not impinge upon rights protected by the Act.
92. In addition to cases cited note 54 supra, see generally NLRB v. Transport Co. of Texas,
438 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1971); C. H. Guenther v. NLRB, 427 F.2d 983 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied. 400 U.S. 942 (1970); NLRB v. Duncan Foundry & Machine Works, Inc., 435 F.2d
612 (7th Cir. 1970). In addition to the Board decisions discussed elsewhere herein, see
generally Krebs & King Toyota, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. No. 74 (1972); Wahl Clipper Corp.,
195 N.L.R.B. No. 104 (1972); Laura E. Weber, dba Weber Nursing Homes, 194 N.L.R.B.
No. 69 (1971); LaGrange Land Corp., 184 N.L.R.B. No. 80 (1970); Ace Drop Cloth Co.,
178 N.L.R.B. 664 (1969); Cartriseal Corp.. 178 N.L.R.B. 272 (1969): Downtowner of
Shreveport, Inc., 175 N.L.R.B. 1106 (1969); Northwest Oyster Farms, Inc., 173 N.L.R.B.
872 (1968).
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and who does not make at least a valid offer of reinstatement, will be
found per se in violation of the Act.9
For this reason the notion of business justification in reality contributes very little to anyone's understanding of striker reinstatement
cases-for the employer's real objective in such cases is hardly ever one
of balancing off the strikers' rights against his own business needs, but
'rather one of simply preventing the Board from reaching the conclusion
that a reinstatement situation exists in the first place. The employer's
purpose, in other words, amounts to denying the presence of any duty
to reinstate rather than justifying his failure to live up to it. And this
denial invariably reduces to one of two assertions: either the job in
question is not available to be filled, or no qualified striker is available
to fill it. For example, the only point which Fleetwood's two illustrations of supposed business justification really prove is that reinstatement is not in order when there are no jobs at hand (because they are
all occupied by permanent replacements or were eliminated for sound,
nonlabor related reasons) to which a striker could be reinstated. Similarly, in other cases, an employer may concede that a particular job is
available (by hiring someone to fill it) but deny that the striker in
question is qualified to return. Physical disability, as noted by the court
in Little Rock Airmotive, affords an obvious example of personal
disqualification, as does manifest incompetence. 9 A striker may be
just as effectively disqualified by operation of law, as well. Failure to
make a genuinely unconditional request to return, 9 5 for instance, will
also serve to block reinstatement-as will participation in misconduct
during the strike.9 6 And, of course, the striker must be available.
Reinstatement cannot be made when he cannot be found, 9 ' or when
he has obtained (if possible) regular and substantially equivalent employment somewhere else.
These examples, like Fleetwood's, have all been pressed into service
as specimens of business justification at one time or another-which
points up the collateral problem encountered when, each time a striker
is legitimately denied reinstatement, it becomes structurally necessary
to support the denial by searching out and identifying some exercise of
"justification." The problem is that the justifications identified do not
always make sense. What does one say, for instance, when an economic
striker suddenly engages in misconduct on the picket line one day and
is therefore lawfully refused reinstatement? Perhaps an employer's
business needs do justify him in refusing to take back a known troublemaker-but the result would be the same if the man had been a model
93. Inasmuch as the Board in Laidlaw rested its finding of "inherent destruction" upon the
employer's failure to come forth with any business justification, the statement that no
justification exists in a reinstatement situation requires this result.
94. Colour IV Corp., 202 N.L.R.B. No. 22 (1973).
95. U.S. Oil & Refining Co., 193 N.L.R.B. 654 (1971).
96. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 187 N.L.R.B. 54 (1970).
97. Little Rock Airmotive, Inc. v. NLRB, 455 F.2d 163, 168 n.8 (8th Cir. 1972).
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employee for 20 years. The result would still be the same if he were
also the chief shop steward for the union and the employer's true
objective in refusing him reinstatement lay in a private desire to
frustrate union activities. Unless the employer is simultaneously welcoming back nonunion adherents who engaged in the same sort of
misconduct, or is otherwise obviously discriminating against the union,
then no justification is necessary. By engaging in prohibited conduct
the striker has simply lost the protection of the Act-has, in effect,
legally disqualified himself for reinstatement regardless of whatever real
reasons the employer may have for not returning him to work. Suppose, too, that another striker leaves town prior to reinstatement, gives
no new address, and in fact never returns or is heard from again. Is it
really necessary to declare that an employer's business considerations
excuse him from the burden of reinstating someone who cannot be
found (perhaps because staffing a plant with nonexistent employees
represents unpreferable management), or is it sufficient merely to admit
that an absent striker cannot be reinstated-again, regardless of whatever real reasons the employer might have for not bringing him back if
he could be found? In neither instance does a true reinstatement
situation exist (nor does one exist in the other examples mentioned
above), and the demand for business justification in such circumstances
results at best in needless excursions down uncertain roads.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Replaced economic strikers, as Laidlaw says, "remain employees"
under the Act; and so long as they remain employees their right to
reinstatement remains alive. The result is the same as obtains, under
Fleetwood, when strikers return to find their jobs rendered temporarily
unavailable by business conditions. In either case, the right to reinstatement endures until the replacements leave or the jobs are revived-at
which time the right must be realized or (presumably) lost. What is
important about both cases is that they do not in terms alter the
requirements for reinstatement but merely defer their reckoning. The
traditional formula-that the capacity for reinstatement of both a given
striker and a given position be adjudged together-has not been
changed; only the moment of judgement has been changed, and that, so
far, only where permanent replacements or the temporary suspension
of work is concerned.
It may be worth noting here, by way of speculation only, that
both Fleetwood and Laidlaw focus upon the temporary unavailability
of jobs rather than of strikers to fill the jobs. The Board has not yet
reached the question of what happens when a striker becomes temporarily disqualified for reinstatement-as, for instance, by illness. The
right to reinstatement is, however, a two-part equation, and if its
exercise can be deferred until one of the parts (the job) becomes
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available, there may be support for deferring it until the other (the
striker) becomes available as well. In other words, there may be circumstances under which a striker's name would be retained on the employer's preferential hiring list even beyond the date on which his
former or equivalent job became available. 9 s
The duration of a striker's right to reinstatement under Laidlaw is
now apparently beyond argument: if it exists at all, it exists foreveror at least until the striker himself relinquishes it. The Board has yet to
squarely answer the question whether strikers may empower their
bargaining representative to waive or otherwise negotiate any limits or
conditions to their Laidlaw rights. Whether they may or not, however,
the Board has made clear that neither the bargaining representative nor
the employer may bind the Board through any private agreement even though they may, as between themselves, be answerable for
failing to negotiate with one another on such an agreement. For those
parties who wish to attempt agreement the Board has outlined the sort
of resolution which it at least "ought to accept."
For the theoretician, Laidlaw offers interesting prospects. As a descendant in the Great Dane-Fleetwood line of § 8(a)(3) thinking, the
case falls heir to a great deal of learned judicial examination of motive
and intent among employers--and yet, at least in application, Laidlaw
and its progeny seem to show little concern for questions of motive.
Indeed, once an actionable reinstatement situation is determined to
exist, motive becomes of no importance: the employer either reinstates
or he does not-he is either guilty of discrimination or he is not. And
once a reinstatement situation is found not to exist, then, unless the
employer through discrimination somehow caused it not to exist,
motive offers little inducement for requiring him to fulfill an obligation
which has not yet been created. The analytical problems posed by
attempting to reconcile this realization with the pre-existing § 8(a)(3)
doctrine of business justification can perhaps best be resolved by saying
that a refusal to reinstate, in a reinstatement situation, amounts to a
prima facie, "inherently destructive" violation of the Act, under which
circumstances questions of proof of motive and business justification
are irrelevant. As a result, the real question turns out to be the factual
one of whether or not a reinstatement situation exists at any given
time. If it does, and if the employer refuses to grant reinstatement, no
further inquiry is needed.
98. Cf. American Gypsum Co., 182 N.L.R.B. 89 (1970), wherein a striker who was legitimately
refused reinstatement because of a newly discovered hernia subsequently underwent
surgery to have the hernia repaired-but without informing the employer. By the time
the striker returned, postoperatively, to again seek reinstatement, the employer had exhausted the preferential hiring list from which the striker had first been recalled and had
made commitments to other, nonstriker applicants for jobs which the striker himself
might have filled. The Board exonerated the employer. What result if the striker had
informed the employer beforehand of the operation and of' his desire to return to work
thereafter?
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Laidlaw has matured, necessarily, on a case-by-case basis. Its requirements are by now reasonably well defined and should be well on their
way to becoming familiar fixtures of the law. As far as the practicing
attorney is concerned, it should also be fairly clear by now that Laidlaw
and its kin do not constitute traps for the unwary so much as for the
employer seeking to cut corners slightly closer than he equitably
should. Honest compliance is relatively a simple matter in the end, and
the Laidlaw doctrine is, ultimately, a livable one.
Michael D. Nossaman

